Wednesday, October 24, 2007

The Question of Universals

“It is said that the students of medieval Paris came to blows in the streets over the existence of universals…[the] issue is our whole conception of our ability to describe the world truly or falsely and the objectivity of any opinion we frame to ourselves.[1] What is it about universals that causes all of this conflict? What exactly is a universal?

Universals are intended to explain features shared by individuals.[2] This can simply be explained as qualities that multiple things have. The idea that they are universal stems from the fact that multiple things can have the same quality. When you see an object that is red, you know that is not the only object in the world that is red. Many objects have the quality of red, or show the quality of redness. Universals can be best explained as abstract generals. They are things that have no location in space-time and apply to more than one thing.[3]

In reality, universals do not explain features shared by individuals. The first problem arises with attribute agreement.[4] Many different things can possess the same attributes. Many walls are white, many shirts are black and many cars are red. To say that these objects possess the quality of whiteness, blackness and redness is wrong on the idea of predicate. You cannot attach an abstract attribute to a particular or general term.[5] You can’t have a general term be describing a specific term. What that does is makes the general description specific which makes the universal pointless. The mere idea of a universal is what makes it impossible to exist in the first place. You can’t have a concrete idea be described in a general fashion.

This denouncement of universals is the reasoning for nominalism. Nominalism is the ideal that you don’t assume that language gives ontological commitment to anything.[6] In simpler terms, nominalism is the belief that only particulars exist and there is no need for anything that refers to an independently existing universal.[7] The motivation for nominalism is that universals are illogical and do not actually explain anything. An object having the quality of redness does not explain what the difference is between a red car and a red shirt.

Another reason for nominalism is that they can explain the features of the world that universals are set to explain. First off, according to Morean facts, things have properties, but properties exist only in the things that they are properties of.[8] What this means is things have certain properties simple because they have certain properties. This seems like it means nothing, but what it does is calls forth the regress of instantiation. X is a property of A. X is an instance of A because it is an instance of being an instance of A and so on forever.[9] Every sentence explains the previous, but it has no end. This is how a property is simply a property of what it is a property of.

Another aspect of universals that nominalism does a better job of explaining is instance of shared properties. Where universals do no explain why they can use general terms to be specific, nominalism simply explains it as two or more things having the same property is a simple fact about things. It is philosophically primitive as it simply does not need further explanation.[10] It is just simply true. The fire truck and the tomato are both considered to be red. That is the end of the discussion. We simply accept the primitive nature and the fact that they are both considered to be red, opposed to having redness.

To summarize, universals are supposed to explain features shared by individuals. Where it is wrong is on the subject of attribute agreement. Multiple things can share the same attributes. What nominalism does is actually explains the properties that universals are trying to explain but though the idea of the instance of shared properties. Nominalism succeeds where universals fail simply because nominalism can explain how multiple things can have the same properties while universals cannot.



[1] Platonism Quotes Handout /Simon Blackburn, Think, Oxford University Press, 1999, page 268

[2] http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/u.htm#uni

[3] Class notes 9/20

[4] Class notes 9/20

[5] Class notes 9/20

[6] Class notes 9/27

[7] http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/n9.htm#nomi

[8] Class notes 9/27

[9] Class notes 9/27

[10] Class notes 9/27

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