Can there be suchness without thisness? Can there be thisness without suchness? These two questions were brought up by Aristotle’s theory of substances. According to Aristotle, suchness can be defined as the qualities of a substance and thisness can be defined as the substance itself. For the two questions at the start of this paragraph, they are simply asking about the existence of a bare suchness or thisness. This causes the question to be raised: if bare suchness or thisness exists, does it imply the existence of said suchness and thisness? According to Aristotle, bare suchness or thisness cannot exist. A quality cannot exist without a substance to give a quality to and substances are nothing without their qualities. With this in mind, there are others that disagree with Aristotle’s theory.
The answers to these questions vary depending on who you ask. To the bundle theorist, the idea of a substance is not necessary as all objects are simply made up of their qualities (they believe that everything is a bundle of qualities) and to remove certain qualities will change the object. There exists no substrata and to remove all the qualities of an object will leave you with nothing left. Therefore, according to the bundle theorist, what makes a thing the thing it is, is its suchness. At what point can you have the same qualities of a substance and not have the exact same substance? Here comes in the identity of indiscernibles. If two things have the exact same qualities, can they be different things? Their placement in space-time can also be a factor in defining their possibility in difference, but to the bundle theorist, they cannot be different things as if their qualities are exactly the same; their placement in space-time is not a factor. To the bundle theorist, only suchness exists so therefore, there can be suchness without thisness but because of their belief of the nonexistence of thisness, there cannot be bare thisness.
To the substratum theorist, there can exist substance without any qualities. They cannot define the object that is left when all of the qualities are removed, but they theorize that something does indeed exist. They state that what makes a thing what it is, is its thisness. This is because removing the qualities does not affect the initial substance and the bare substance that would exist would still be the initial thing. They disagree with the bundle theorist as they believe in the existence of bare substances.
Myself, I feel there is validity in both theories of thisness and suchness. Taken at values not far beyond the metaphysical realm, the bundle theorist’s view makes perfect sense. Take a favored Kochian[5] example of a trash can in a classroom. If you take qualities away from the trash can, be its hollowness, its ability to keep trash inside of it, does it still remain a trash can? Most people would agree that it would no longer be able to fulfill its duties as a trash can so therefore no longer is a trash can, but it would become whatever removing certain qualities would make it. Go on an extreme and flatten out the trash can into a circular piece of metal. It can no longer hold trash, so is it still a trash can? It is at this point where I disagree with the bundle theorists. Sure, the trash can is no longer useful in containing trash, but it still carries the label trash can. If someone were to enter the room, they would probably exclaim “what happened to this trash can?” According to the bundle theorist, it is no longer a trash can, but because of what it used to be, it retained its trash can qualities. Who is right? On the surface, it is easy to simply say that the passerby is just wrong, but to a room with a bundle theorist and substratum theorist arguing it might tilt the favor in the substratum theorist’s direction. The only problem is that there cannot be a definite right answer as either side cannot fully prove their theory to its fullest extent. All they can do is debate into their perpetual stalemate.
It is after all of this where one tries to place him or herself into these theories. This creates more problems with the bundle theorists. A quality a person can have is having hair. If one were to shave off all hair on their body, they lose the quality of having hair. Are they the same person? I would think yes. A bundle theorist that dislikes being proven wrong might say that they changes and went from person with hair to the hairless. This can be debated but what about qualities of personality that are not concrete? A person is in love and then falls out of it, did they lose the quality of being in love, or are they the same person? As more and more layers are added, the more complex it becomes. Relating this to you is even harder.
Am I an individual? Depends on how you look at it. From the grandest perspective, we are dust specks of dust specks to dust specks. We are simply yet another chain of carbon in the immensity that is the universe. On the most personal scale, we are all our own person. We have memories, feelings, wants, desires and dreams. So, when you go beyond your own consciousness, you cease to be an individual. As soon as you look around the world around you, you become another nameless face that makes up the world. So, when I think about it, I am an individual. There will never be another person exactly like me with my thought processes and my body, but in the grand scale of things, do I matter? In reality every animal simply exists to reproduce and make sure my genetic material passes along and nothing else. Whatever we do is simply extra things that we put value on.
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